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[1] "Presumed Guilty, How & Why the W.C. Framed Lee Harvey Oswald" [4/11]

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      PART II:


      THE MEDICAL/BALLISTICS EVIDENCE










                              *  *  *  *  *  *  *




      3


      Suppressed Spectrography




      In the final analysis, the Warren Commission had three pieces of
      tangible evidence that linked Lee Harvey Oswald to the
      assassination of President Kennedy:  (1) A rifle purchased by
      Oswald and three empty cartridge cases fired in that rifle were
      discovered on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository,
      (2) a nearly whole bullet that had been fired from Oswald's rifle
      was found on a stretcher at Parkland Hospital, and (3) two
      fragments of a bullet or bullets that had been fired from Oswald's
      rifle were found on the front seat of the presidential limousine.
         Yet, there is nothing in this evidence itself to prove either
      that Oswald's rifle was used in the shooting or, if it was, that
      Oswald fired it.  The whole fault in the Commission's case relating
      the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle to the shooting is this:  bullets
      identifiable with that rifle were found {outside} of the victims'
      bodies.  Pieces of metal not traceable to any rifle were found
      {inside} the bodies.  The Report merely assumes the legitimacy of
      the specimens found externally and works on the assumption that
      these bullets and fragments had once been {inside} the bodies, and
      thus were involved in the shooting.
         Obviously, bullets found outside the bodies are entirely
      circumstantial evidence, for although they may be conclusively
      linked with a particular weapon, their location of discovery does
      not link them with a particular victim.  No matter how close to the
      victims or to the scene of the crime these bullets were found, as
      long as they were not {in} the actual bodies when discovered, proof
      is lacking that they were ever in the bodies at all.  If Commission
      Exhibit 399, the nearly whole bullet found on a stretcher at
      Parkland, had been removed from Governor Connally's body, it could
      be asserted that it had indeed produced his wounds.  Likewise, if
      the identifiable bullet fragments found on the front seat of the
      limousine had instead been located in President Kennedy's head
      wound, we would have the proof linking Oswald's rifle to the fatal
      shot.
         In the case of the assassination, there was an easy and
      conclusive way to determine whether the bullet specimens found
      {outside} the bodies had ever been {inside} the victims, thus
      providing either the proof or the disproof of the notion that
      Oswald's rifle was used in the shooting.  This conclusive evidence
      is the spectrographic comparison made between the metallic
      compositions of the projectiles found outside of the victims and
      the bits of metal removed from the wounds themselves.
         Spectrography is an exact science.  In spectrographic analysis,
      a test substance is irradiated so that all of the elements
      composing it emit a distinct spectrum.  These spectra are recorded
      on film and analyzed both qualitatively (to determine exactly which
      elements compose the substance in question) and quantitatively (to
      determine the exact percentage of each element present).  Through
      such analysis, two substances may be compared in extremely fine
      detail, down to the percentages of even their most minor
      constituents.[1]
         Comparative chemical analysis such as spectrography has long
      been a vital tool in crime solving.  The following are actual cases
      that illustrate the value of such comparison:

          1.  A deformed slug with some white metal adhering to it
              was found at the scene where a man had been shot, but
              not wounded.  The white metal was first suspected to be
              nickel, which would have indicated a nickel-coated
              bullet, but was subsequently tested and found to be
              silver from a cigarette case that had been penetrated.
              The slugs in the cartridges taken from the suspect in
              the attack were analyzed and found to differ in
              composition from the projectile used in the shooting;
              the suspect thus escaped conviction.

          2.  In another case, a man escaped conviction because of
              dissimilarities in composition found upon comparative
              analysis of the bullet removed from the wounded man and
              bullets from cartridges seized in the suspect's house.
              The former contained a trace of antimony and no tin and
              the latter contained a comparatively large amount of
              tin.

          3.  A night watchman shot at some unidentified persons
              fleeing the scene of a robbery, but all escaped.  Blood
              found at the scene the next morning indicated that one
              of the persons had been wounded and subsequently a man
              was arrested with a bullet wound in his leg for which
              he could provide no plausible explanation.  Analysis
              demonstrated that lead fragments removed from the wound
              did not agree in composition with the slugs in the
              watchman's cartridges and the man was released.  The
              impurities present in the lead were the same in each
              case, consisting chiefly of antimony, but the fragments
              from the wound contained much less antimony than the
              watchman's slugs.[2]

         The identifiable bullets and fragments found {outside} the
      victims' bodies are the suspect specimens in the presidential
      assassination.  The tiny pieces of metal found {inside} the bodies
      are, in effect, the control specimens.  All of the specimens--
      including those removed from the President and the Governor--were
      subjected to spectrographic analysis.  The results of these
      analyses hold the conclusive answer to the problem that was the
      central issue in the question of Oswald's guilt:  Did the bullets
      from Oswald's rifle produce the wounds of the victims?
         The spectrographic analyses could solve this central problem
      through minute qualitative and quantitative comparison.  If a
      fragment from a body was not {identical} in composition with a
      suspect bullet, that bullet could not have entered the body and
      left the fragment in question.  The requirements for "identical"
      composition are stringent;  if the exact elements are not present
      in the exact percentages from one sample to another, there is no
      match and the samples must have originated from two different
      sources.  If a fragment is found to be identical in composition
      with a suspect bullet, it is possible that the bullet deposited the
      fragment in the body.  However, before this can be conclusively
      proven, it must be demonstrated that other bullets manufactured
      from the same batch of metal were not employed in the crime.[3]
      Some of the major comparisons that should have been made in the
      case of the President's death are these:

          1.  The Commission apparently believed that the two large
              bullet fragments (one containing part of a lead core)
              found on the front seat of the car and traceable to
              Oswald's rifle were responsible for the head wounds.
              Two pieces of lead were recovered from the President's
              head.  The head fragments could have been compared to
              the car fragment containing lead.  Had the slightest
              difference in composition been found, the car fragments
              could not have caused the head wounds.

          2.  The Commission believed that the two car fragments were
              part of the same bullet.  Spectrographic comparison
              might have determined this.

          3.  Copper traces were found on the bullet holes in the
              back of the President's coat and shirt.  Since the
              Commission believed that bullet 399 penetrated the
              President's neck, the copper residues on the clothing
              could have been compared with the copper jacket of 399
              for a conclusive answer.  Any dissimilarity between the
              two copper samples would rule out 399.

          4.  The Commission believed that 399 wounded Governor
              Connally.  Fragments of lead were removed from the
              Governor's wrist.  These could have been compared with
              the lead core of 399.  Again, any dissimilarity would
              conclusively disassociate 399 from Connally's wounds.
              An identical match might support the Commission's
              belief.

          5.  The lead from the Governor's wrist could have been
              compared with the lead from one of the identifiable car
              fragments to determine whether this might have caused
              Connally's wounds in the event that 399 did not.  This
              could have associated "Oswald's" rifle with the wounds
              even if 399 had been proven "illegitimate."

          6.  The lead residue found on the crack in the windshield
              of the car could have been compared with fragments from
              the two bodies plus fragments from the car in an effort
              to determine which shot caused the windshield damage.

          7.  As a control, the lead and copper composition of 399
              could have been compared to that of the identifiable
              car fragments to determine whether all were made from
              the same batches of metal.

         The government had in its possession the conclusive proof or
      disproof of its theories.  It is not presumptuous to assume that,
      had the spectrographic analyses provided the incontrovertible proof
      of the validity of the Warren Report's central conclusions, they
      would have been employed in the Report, eliminating virtually all
      of the controversy and doubt that have raged over the official
      assertions.
         But the complete results of the spectrographic analyses were
      never reported to the Commission;  there is no indication that the
      Commission ever requested or desired them;  they are not in the
      printed exhibits or the Commission's unpublished files;  no expert
      testimony relevant to them was ever adduced;  and to this day, the
      Department of Justice is withholding the complete results from
      researchers.
         On November 23, 1963, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sent a report
      to Dallas Police Chief Jesse Curry summarizing the results of FBI
      laboratory examinations, including spectrographic analysis (see
      24H262-64).  On the matter of composition, Hoover said only that
      the jackets of the found specimens were "copper alloy" and the
      cores and other pieces, "lead."  The element mixed with the copper
      to form the "alloy" is not even mentioned.  It is quite unlikely
      that the other specimens were composed solely of "lead," for the
      lead employed in practically all modern bullets is mixed with small
      quantities of antimony, bismuth, and arsenic.[4]  The only
      spectrographic comparison mentioned in this report is meaningless:

            The lead metal of [exhibits] Q4 and Q5 [fragments from
         the President's head], Q9 [fragment(s) from the Governor's
         wrist], Q14 [three pieces of lead found under the left jump
         seat in the limousine] and Q15 [scraping from the windshield
         crack] is similar to the lead of the core of the bullet
         fragment, Q2 [found on the front seat of the car].

      That two samples are "similar" in composition is without meaning in
      terms of the precise data yielded through spectrographic analysis.
      The crucial determination, "identical" or "not identical," is
      consistently avoided.  Also avoided is the essential comparison
      between the "stretcher bullet," 399, and the metal fragments
      removed from the Governor's wrist.
         The Commission sought virtually no testimony relevant to the
      spectrographic analysis.  When it did seek this testimony, it asked
      the wrong questions of the wrong people.  FBI ballistics expert
      Robert Frazier gave testimony about these tests on May 13, 1964.
      At this time, he told the Commission and Arlen Specter, his
      interrogator, that the spectrographics examinations were performed
      by a spectrographer, John F. Gallager (5H67, 69).  Frazier,
      accepted by the Commission only as a "qualified witness on
      firearms" (3H392), was not a spectrographic expert.  His field was
      ballistics and firearms identification, and while he might have
      supplemented his findings with those from other fields, he was not
      qualified in spectrography, which entails expertise in physics and
      chemistry.  Gallagher, the expert, could well be called the
      Commission's most-avoided witness.  His testimony, the {last} taken
      in the entire investigation, was given in a deposition attended by
      a stenographer and a staff member the week before the Warren Report
      was submitted to President Johnson.  At this time, he was not asked
      a single question relating to the spectrographic analyses.[5] (See
      15H746ff.)
         Neither Specter nor the Commission members can deny having known
      that Frazier was not the man qualified to testify about
      spectrographic analysis;  Frazier stated this in his testimony:

            Mr. Specter:  Was it your job to analyze all of the
         bullets or bullet fragments which were found in the
         President's car?
            Mr. Frazier:  Yes;  it was, {except for the
         spectrographic analysis of the composition}.  (5H68;
         emphasis added)

      Frazier added, "I don't know actually whether I am expected to give
      the results of (the spectrographer's) analysis or not" (5H59).  If
      this statement fails to make it clear that Frazier was not prepared
      to testify about the results of the spectrographic analyses, an
      earlier statement by him leaves no doubt:  "[The spectrographic]
      examination was performed by a spectrographer, John F. Gallagher,
      and I do not have the results of his examination here" (5H67).  If
      Frazier did not have the actual report of the results of the tests
      with him when he appeared before the Commission, there was
      obviously no way of vouching for the accuracy of the findings to
      which he testified, whether he was qualified as an expert in
      spectrography or not.  Also, Frazier's knowledge of the
      spectrographic analysis was merely secondhand;  he was aware of the
      results of these tests because the spectrographer "submitted his
      report to me" (5H69).  Thus, Frazier played no role in conducting
      this analysis.  His only "qualification" for giving testimony about
      the spectrographic analyses was that he had read a report about
      them.  Because this report is not part of the public records, we
      have no way of determining whether Frazier accurately related the
      results of the analyses, or whether the report upon which he based
      his testimony was competent, complete, or satisfactory.  In short,
      we are asked to take Frazier on his word when (1) he knew of these
      tests only secondhand, (2) he did not have the actual results with
      him when he testified about them, and (3) he had no expertise in
      spectrography.  On this basis alone, Frazier's testimony concerning
      the tests is not worthy of credence.
         However, if we examine exactly what Frazier specified as the
      results of the spectrographic analyses, it becomes apparent that
      his testimony, if true, is meaningless and incomplete.  Frazier
      spoke of essentially the same comparisons that Hoover did in his
      letter to police chief Curry, repeating Hoovers meaningless
      designation that the ballistic specimens compared were "found to be
      similar in metallic composition" (5H67, 69, 73-74).  When the
      {exact} composition had been determined to a minute degree and
      could be compared for conclusive and meaningful answers, there was
      no legitimate reason to accept this testimony about mere
      "similarities" in composition.  Furthermore, Frazier offered his
      opinion that the spectrographic analyses were inconclusive in
      determining the origin of certain of the ballistics specimens
      (5H67, 69, 73-74).  However, because Frazier was not a
      spectrographic expert and because the actual report of these tests
      is not available, his interpretation of the test results is
      worthless.  Even at that, Frazier and his Commission interrogator,
      Arlen Specter, avoided mention of those comparisons affecting the
      legitimacy of bullet 399--namely, the copper from the President's
      clothing and the lead from Governor Connally's wrist as compared
      with the copper and lead of 399.
         Frazier was cross-examined at the New Orleans conspiracy trial
      of Clay Shaw.  Here he was pressed further on the spectrographic
      analysis.  When asked about any "similarity" in the compositions of
      the various ballistic specimens he replied, "They all had the same
      metallic composition as far as the lead core or lead portions of
      these objects is concerned."[6]
         This response prompts two inferences.  First, Frazier
      specifically excluded as being the "same in metallic composition"
      the {copper} portions of the specimens.  If this omission was
      necessitated by the fact that the copper of the recovered specimens
      did not match in composition, a significant part of the Warren
      Report is disproved.  Second, Frazier's description of the lead as
      being the "same" in composition is ambiguous.  Did he mean that the
      {elements} of the composition or the {percentages} of the elements
      were the "same"?  In the former case, his testimony would again be
      meaningless, for {what} is contained in the metal is not so
      important as {how much} is contained.  If the percentages were the
      same, the Report could be confirmed.
         Further questioning by Attorney Oser cleared up this ambiguity.

            Mr. Oser:  Am I correct in saying there is a similarity
         in metallic composition or they are identical?
            Mr. Frazier:  It was identical as far as the metallic
         {elements} are concerned.[7] (emphasis added)

      Here Frazier leaves no doubt that the individual {elements} in the
      various lead samples were identical.  What he avoids saying is that
      the percentages of those elements were identical throughout.  This
      is the crucial point.  If anything, Frazier's specification that
      the {elements} were identical (when questioned about the
      {composition}) leads to the inference that the percentages of those
      elements were not identical, hence the recovered specimens could
      {not} be related and the Warren Report is necessarily invalid.
         The Commission's failure to obtain the complete spectrographic
      analyses and to adduce meaningful expert testimony on them can be
      viewed only with suspicion.  Here was the absolute proof or
      disproof of the official theories.  If truth was the Commission's
      objective, there can be no explanation for the exclusion of these
      tests from the record.  If the Commission was right in its
      "solution" of the assassination, for what reason could it
      conceivably have omitted the {proof} of its validity?  One is
      reasonably led to believe that the spectrographic analyses proved
      the opposite of what the Commission asserted.
         If the Commission's failure to produce the spectrographic
      analyses was no more than a glaring oversight, the remedy is indeed
      a simple one.  The government need only release these tests to the
      public.  They cannot contain the gore that makes publication of the
      President's autopsy pictures a matter of questionable taste.  They
      cannot be injurious to living persons as other classified reports
      might be.  They cannot threaten our national defense.  They are
      merely a collection of highly scientific data that could support or
      destroy the entire official solution to the assassination.
         The government has to this day kept them squelched.
         Harold Weisberg, the first researcher to recognize the
      significance of the spectrographic tests and their omission from
      the record, has fought and continues to fight for access to the
      report detailing these tests.  In 1967, Weisberg wrote as follows
      of his efforts to obtain the tests:

            On October 31, 1966, then Acting Attorney General Clark
         ordered that everything considered by the Commission and in
         the possession of the government be placed in the National
         Archives.  I had written [J. Edgar] Hoover five months
         earlier, on May 23, 1966, asking for access to the
         spectrographic analysis of the bullet allegedly used in the
         assassination and the various bullet fragments, clearly the
         most basic evidence, but not in the printed evidence.  He
         has not yet answered that letter.  Since issuance of the
         Attorney General's order, I have on a number of occasions
         requested this evidence of the Archives.  Hoover, as of
         March 1967, had not turned it over.  Once, in my presence,
         one of his agents deceived the Archives by falsely reporting
         this analysis was in an FBI file that was accessible.  Since
         then, silence, but no spectrographic analysis.[8]

         Weisberg's efforts have continued.  In 1970, he made available
      to me all of his government correspondence.  I saw, over the
      signatures of then Attorney General John Mitchell and Deputy
      Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, the government's constant
      refusal to release the spectrographic analyses.[9]  Having
      exhausted his administrative remedies, Weisberg took the Justice
      Department to court, suing for release under provisions of the
      "Freedom of Information" law.  The U.S. District Court for the
      District of Columbia ruled against Weisberg in this case, Civil
      Action No. 712-70.  Weisberg and his attorney appealed this
      decision, and the appeal, brief No. 71-1026, is currently before
      the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
         Without the spectrographic analyses, there is {no} evidence to
      associate Oswald's rifle with the wounds suffered by President
      Kennedy and Governor Connally.  Nothing was found in the body of
      either victim that would suggest a connection between that specific
      Mannlicher-Carcano and the wounds.  The spectrographic tests might
      establish such a connection;  they might also conclusively
      {dissociate} that rifle from the wounds.  However, omission of the
      exact spectrographic results from the Commission's evidence and the
      subsequent refusal of the government to release the
      spectrographer's findings do not leave one at all confident that
      these tests support the official solution to the assassination.



__________

 [1] See "Spectrography" in "Encyclopaedia Britannica" (Chicago:
     William Benton Publishers, 1963), vol. 21, and "Photography" in
     vol. 17;  Herbert Dingle, "Practical Applications of Spectrum
     Analysis" (London:  Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1950), pp. 1-3, 74-75,
     122-24.

 [2] A. Lucas, "Forensic Chemistry and Scientific Criminal Investigation"
     (New York:  Longmans, Green and Co., 1935), pp. 265-66.

 [3] Author's interview with Dr. John Nichols on April 16, 1970.  See
     also Nichols's statement in the "Dallas Morning News," June 19, 1970.

 [4] "The Winchester-Western Ammunition Handbook" (New York:  Pocket
     Books, Inc., 1964), p. 120. (Hereinafter referred to as "Winchester
     Handbook.")

 [5] First public attention drawn to the spectrographic analyses and
     their omission from the Commission's record was by Harold Weisberg
     in "Whitewash," p. 164.  Sylvia Meagher later discussed this topic
     in her book, pp. 170-72.

 [6] Transcript of court proceedings of February 21, 1969, in "State of
     Louisiana v. Clay L. Shaw," p. 40. (Hereinafter referred to as
     "Frazier 2/21/69 testimony.")

 [7] Ibid., p. 41.

 [8] Weisberg, "Oswald in New Orleans," pp. 148-49.

 [9] Weisberg's attorney in this case, Bernard Fensterwald, requested
     that his client be furnished with the spectrographic analyses in a
     letter to Justice Department lawyer Joseph Cella, dated October 9,
     1969.  Then Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst responded to
     this request in a letter dated November 13, 1969;  he refused to
     disclose the document, (These letters are a part of the public
     record.  They are part of the set of exhibits appended to the
     "COMPLAINT" dated March 11, 1970, filed in U.S. District Court for
     the District of Columbia in the case of "Harold Weisberg v. U.S.
     Department of Justice and U.S. Department of State," Civil Action
     No. 718-70.)
       Weisberg has attempted to obtain the report of the spectrographer
     through a series of written requests dated May 23, 1966, March 12,
     1967, January 1, 1969, June 2, 1969, April 6, 1970, May 15, 1970,
     and an official request form submitted on May 10, 1970.  In a letter
     dated June 4, 1970, then Attorney General John Mitchell personally
     denied Weisberg's request for access.  Richard Kleindienst, in a
     letter dated June 12, 1970, also denied Weisberg's request.  (These
     letters are also a part of the public record.  They are contained in
     the appendix to Appeal No. 71-1026, "Weisberg v. U.S. Department of
     Justice," filed by attorney for plaintiff-appellant in the U.S.
     Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.)